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INTRODUCTION
n July 2007, Swedbank acquired the Ukrainian bank TAS from a local oligarch Sergej Tigipko for about 800 million USD (Swedbank, 2007, July 9) . Growth prospects were enormous and many foreign banks were streaming to Ukraine, an investment Klondike at that time. Only 5 years later since arrival to Ukraine, in April 2013, Swedbank informed the market that it would totally discontinue its operations in Ukraine (Swedbank, 2013, April 1) . Some journalists compared this Swedbank's investment with a historical loss of the Swedish army during Poltava battle. How it could go so wrong so quickly? Is it possible to govern foreign investments? Or is it random probability that determines the outcome of acquisitions abroad?
SWEDBANK'S INTERNALIZATION STRATEGY IN BALTIC COUNTRIES, RUSSIA & UKRAINE
Swedbank, one of the four major Swedish banks, has its roots in the Swedish savings bank tradition dating back to 1820. In 2014 Swedbank had about 8 million private customers, more than 600,000 companies and organizations, over 14,000 employees and around 500 branches. Swedbank's total income in 2014 exceeded 5 billion USD, annual profit was approximately 2.15 billion USD, total assets were 274 billion USD and lending to the public amounted to 171 billion USD 1 (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) . Swedbank is used to apply a traditional banking model focused on close customer relationships and personal advice to private individuals as well as small-and medium-sized companies.
When reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) took place, the interest was turned to the new emerging markets, geographically closely located to Sweden -the Baltic countries and Russia, often labeled as transition economies. The Baltic economies had experienced an extended period of economic growth. Average annual real GDP growth was 8% in 2000-2006, which 
made the Baltic countries the fastest-growing region in the European
The banking market in Sweden is a mature one, characterized by a tough competition between banks. A question emerged, if Swedbank's strategy should be changed from being primarily a Swedish bank to an international banking group with Swedish roots. "Swedbank's aim is to grow. European countries with lower than-average GDP per capita and penetration of financial services, particularly in Eastern Europe, are considered to offer the greatest opportunities for long-term growth", -stated Swedbank in the Annual report for 2007. Stable earnings in Sweden and strong balance sheet could support such a growing internationalization strategy. Ukraine, with its 47 million populations, was one of the countries that experienced the greatest economic decline after the fall of communism, by 60 percent between 1990 and 1999 . However, between 2000 .4% per year (Swedbank, Annual report 2007) . Household consumption was growing strongly thanks to a robust job market and falling unemployment as well as double-digit increases in real disposable income. From the early days of the Orange Revolution in 2004 to the market's peak at the end of 2007, the Ukrainian First Stock Trade System index boasted an impressive increase exceeding 500%. In 2007, the Ukrainian stock market was ranked the best performing stock market in the world, which explained the interest of foreign financial investors (Zelenyuk, 2007) .
Rapid credit growth in Ukraine was contributing to higher spending and investments. Credit growth reached 76% on an annual basis in July 2007. Bank loans accounted for over 15% of financing for corporate investments, compared with 8% in [2003] [2004] . However, forward-looking potential was attractive: GDP per capita in Ukraine was only 25% of the OECD average, leaving plenty of room for a "catch-up" growth (Swedbank, Annual report 2007) .
In early July 2007, Swedbank acquired the Ukrainian bank TAS-Kommerzbank with its subsidiary TAS-Investbank from the local oligarch Sergej Tigipko for about 800 million USD. An additional payment of up to 250 million USD should be payable in three years, subject to growth performance (Swedbank, 2007, July 9 ). Swedbank's acquisition of TAS-Kommertzbank and TAS-Investbank was part of the internationalization strategy in growth outside the group's home markets. After acquisition in Ukraine, the amount of Russian-speaking employees at Swedbank Group (including Baltic countries) had exceeded the amount of Swedish-speaking persons.
Swedbank's own risk department was asked to prepare a report summarizing risks associated with the FDI in the Ukrainian bank (Forsberg, 2009) . Report highlighted both political and economic risks associated with such an investment, including internal political instability and on-going conflict between Ukraine and Russia regarding gas supply and transmission. Besides, the report pointed on the underdeveloped legal system, risk of devaluation of hryvna (UAH), Ukrainian national currency, and corruption. On the anti-corruption organization Transparency International's list of 168 countries, Ukraine is currently on a 130th place.
2 These warning conclusions, however, could not stop the acquisition.
An audit company Ernst & Young performed the so called 'due diligence' report in connection with the acquisition of TAS banks (Forsberg, 2009) . Ernst & Young found that TAS, which was owned by Ukrainian oligarch Sergej Tigipko, provided loans to different companies belonging to Tigipko's own business imperium. Swedbank, therefore, through acquisition of TAS banks, would inherit loans related to Tigipko's companies. One might question if the Western investor should buy a bank with dependency on the business of the former owner. On the other hand, many banks in transition economies were founded as a 'pocket banks' of local oligarchs servicing their financial needs. The TAS' dependency on companies belonging to Tigipko's imperium was not a unique, but a standard practice in the Ukrainian business environment.
An impressive profit exceeding 2.3 billion USD earned by Swedbank in 2007 (among others, due to contribution from the Baltic countries) was a good supporting argument for the expansion strategy (Swedbank, Annual report 2007) . And Swedbank saw its leading position in the Baltic region as a springboard to the larger Ukrainian economy. "The current situation in Ukraine is similar to what we saw in the Baltics for 8-10 years ago. Possibilities are high in future", -explained Carl Eric Stålberg, at that time the Chairman of the Board of Swedbank AB, to Swedish business newspaper "Dagens industi" on the 7 th of February 2007.
banks rapidly expanded regional network and volume of assets. Risks, performance and strategy were often subordinated to growth and marketing targets. The main drive for local oligarchs was to get a good price to be paid by foreign investors.
To justify the gargantuan prices, the purchased bank was expected to provide sustainable rapid growth in assets at 10-12% annually, about 20% annual ROE (return on equity) and equity value growth in the range of 13-16% annually (Hrebeniuk, 2012) . That was an approximate financial target of foreign investors regarding their acquisitions in the Ukrainian banking sector at that time.
According to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) (Swedbank, Annual report 2007) . The smaller bank, CJSC Swedbank Invest, had a niche offering loans primarily for investment projects and high net worth individuals, while the larger OJSC Swedbank was a universal bank. However, the banks' product offerings partly overlap and banks even compete with each other for customers and projects. It was decided, however, to continue to run these two banks as separate units.
It was also agreed that TAS' former owner, Sergej Tigipko, would continue to act as CEO and would have overall responsibility for the bank's business and development. Mr. Tigipko at that time had over 14 years of top level banking experience, including top positions as the Governor of Ukraine's Central Bank as well as Minister of Economy and Vice Prime Minister (Swedbank, 2007, February 7; Waltersson, 2009 ). In connection with acquisition, it was agreed with Tigipko about additional payment of up to 250 million USD that could be payable in three years, subject to growth performance. Top management of TAS banks remained and continued to work for Swedbank (Swedbank, 2007, July 9) .
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES AND ITS IMPACT ON SWEDBANK
During 2000s, the global economy was stimulated by low interest rates, rising asset prices and credit expansion. At the same time, imbalances increased and debt levels rose to ever higher levels in both OECD countries and transition economies. 2008 saw the start of the most serious international financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It resulted in the threat of collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many countries, the housing market also suffered resulting in the subprime mortgage crisis, reintroducing the world to an era of bank failures, a credit crunch, private defaults and massive layoffs. The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007 , when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing a 'complete evaporation of liquidity' (Gangahar and Jones, 2007) . In March 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided an emergency loan to The Bear Stearns, a New York based global investment bank, try to avert a collapse of the company. However, Bear Stearns could not be saved and was sold to JP Morgan Chase (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013). The collapse of the company was a prelude to the risk management meltdown of the investment banking industry.
On September 15, 2008 , Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the US, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection following drastic losses in its stock and devaluation of its assets by credit rating agencies (CNBC, 2008) . Swedbank was exposed to Lehman Brothers through some loans, but fortunately they were secured by real estates located in the US (Swedbank, 2008, October 7; Almgren, 2008, September 25) . It is interesting to note that Lehman Brothers acted as a financial advisor to Swedbank in their acquisition of TAS banks in Ukraine. A downturn in economic activity started to lead to the 2008-2012' global recession.
Strong credit growth in the Baltic countries and interest rates that were too low relative to economic growth had begun to lead to an imbalance in prices, which was particularly noticeable in the real estate market. During 2007, when the real estate bubble burst after financing terms tightened, it started to be obvious that the rapid growth in the Baltic countries was not sustainable. The current account deficit, which had swelled in pace with rapidly growing imports, reached 20-30% of GDP in the Baltic countries. In December 2008, inflation was 7% in Estonia and 8.5% in Lithuania. Latvia's inflation rate was 10.5% in December 2008, declined from slightly over 17% in mid-2008. In 2008, Latvia's GDP shrank by minus 4.6% and Estonia's by minus 3.6%, while Lithuania's slowed down to 3% (Swedbank, Annual report 2008) . As the crisis swept across CEE, the economic reversal intensified: Estonia's GDP dropped by minus 16.2% year-on-year, Latvia's by minus 19.6% and Lithuania's by minus 16.8%. By mid-2009, all three countries experienced one of the deepest recessions in the world (Swedbank, Annual report 2009 ).
Due to the growing global financial crisis, the small but open economy of Ukraine also started to face turbulence. From Q4 2008 until Q1 2009, the economic situation in Ukraine became intolerable. The local currency declined from UAH 5 to a low of 9.5 to the USD before stabilizing at around 8 to the USD. GDP declined by a ruinous 15% during the whole of 2009 and the stock market, by the end of Q1 2009, had given up all of its gains of the previous 3 years and returned to pre-Orange Revolution levels (Swedbank, Annual report 2009) . Demand for Ukrainian production, especially metals, fell in connection with the global recession, and external capital flows essentially came to a halt. Since the debts of domestic banks were largely denominated in foreign currency, depreciation of UAH led to severe banking crises.
At the same time, the Ukrainian economy was weighed down by a long-standing political crisis, which was delaying required structural reforms. In November 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered help and approved a Stand-By Arrangement for 16.4 billion USD to stabilize the economy of Ukraine (IMF, 2008, November 5) .
During 2008, Swedbank started to be affected by rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions, particularly in the Baltic countries and Ukraine, where Swedbank operated. Lending growth in the Baltic countries slowed from 33% in 2007 to 6% in 2008. Loan losses increased to 230 million USD. Although the share of impaired loans was only slightly over 2%, it was 5 times higher than in the previous year (Swedbank, Annual report 2008) . It became obvious that Swedbank should revise the strategy in the Baltics and Ukraine and break the loan growth. The expansion continued too long and employees were rewarded for growth.
For 2009, Swedbank's profit before credit impairments for the Baltic countries was 630 million USD. Credit impairments for Baltic banking, however, reached 2 billion USD. Profit in Ukraine for 2009 was about 68 million USD, while credit impairments of 890 million USD accompanied with a goodwill' depreciation resulted in an operating loss of 1 billion USD. For comparison, operating profit for the Swedish banking' business area during 2009 reached 1.1 billion USD while Swedbank Markets, an investment banking unit, generated profit of 452 million USD. Profit earned by the 'Swedish part' of the bank and its investment unit was not enough to off-set losses in Baltics and Ukraine. In 2009 Swedbank Group showed a total loss exceeding 1.3 billion USD (Swedbank, Annual report 2009). 3 Swedbank started to face one of the biggest challenges in the bank's history since 1820s. It was a question of survival, and external help was needed to overcome the crises. In October 2008, Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) initiated a series of liquidity measures, lending money to Swedish banks in order to avoid a more serious credit crunch. The government decided at the same time to introduce a financial stability plan, part of which included a guarantee programme to refinance Swedish banks. The Swedish National Debt Office granted Swedbank's application to participate in the Swedish state's guarantee programme (Swedbank, Annual report 2008) .
During 2008 and 2009, Swedbank executed two additional rights issues that gave Swedbank about 3.7 billion USD (Swedbank, Annual reports 2008 and . The rationale behind the rights issue was to take proactive and decisive action in this volatile and uncertain market environment. An important objective of the rights issue was to gradually leave the guarantee programme.
Several projects in 2008 and 2009 at Swedbank centered on further enhancing the efficiency and quality of credit processes, from credit assessment to distressed debt management. In general, more stringent lending criteria have been imposed prioritizing to identify and target customers with strong loan servicing ratios. In addition, more resources were assigned to the team responsible for handling distressed debt. Swedbank Ukraine's rating was cut by the rating agency Fitch to 'E'-level on January, 29th, 2009. Fitch's individual rating 'E' indicated that a bank had very serious problems, which either required or would likely to require external support. Fitch Ratings explained that it downgraded Swedbank Ukraine to reflect the bank's increased credit risk. According to Fitch, Swedbank's loan portfolio grew 170% over nine months of 2008, which was at very high speed taking into account the turbulent market situation. Besides, Swedbank had a high concentration of foreign-currency loans, higher than the majority of its peer banks. At the end of 2008, about 80% of Swedbank's total loans in Ukraine were in foreign currency (Concorde Capital, 2009, January 29) .
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Cheap funding available from Sweden in USD, aimed to boost the growth strategy in Ukraine, had a negative impact after UAH depreciated by 60%. Such depreciation was especially suffered by private persons and companies that took loans in hard currency without having matching revenues in the same currency.
Due to uncertainty on the market and global turbulence, Swedbank started to revise the growth targets downward. In 2008, it was decided that at least throughout 2009, the operations would focus on quality control rather than growth. New lending was almost abolished and Swedbank placed high quality requirements on new lending to small and medium-sized companies.
In order to improve governance, risk management, transparency and achieve economies of scale, Swedbank's special risk team for financial restructuring and recovery, FR&R, was established in Ukraine. The team was going through all sizable impaired loans, helping the bank either to restructure or to recover the loans. 'Restructuring' and 'recovery' became the major daily concepts replacing previously applied 'growth strategy' and 'market share targets'. Hundreds of corporate loans and thousands of private credits had been worked out, which finally contributed to the better outcome. As a result, restructured loans in Swedbank Ukraine exceeded 288 million USD in 2009 (Swedbank, Annual report 2009).
Although Swedbank started to adjust the strategy to the worsening market conditions, the move was obviously not enough quick to reflect the dramatic changes in the business environment. At the same time, Swedbank discovered that protection of creditor rights was extremely weak due to inadequate legislation and high corruption level.
Swedbank decided to write off the remaining goodwill in Ukrainian investment in 2009 (Swedbank, Annual report 2009). Goodwill of approximately 673 million USD gained by Swedbank as a result of acquisition of TAS banks disappeared in 2 years after investment was made (Waltersson, 2009) . Investment banking company BG Capital Research estimated that Swedbank also injected about 450 million USD in equity and subordinated debt into its Ukrainian subsidiary in order to survive the crises situation (Vavryshchuk, 2010) .
According to NBU, the exposure to a single customer at the Ukrainian banks should not exceed 25% of the bank's capital base, the same rules that apply in Sweden. Swedbank Ukraine inherited loans to Sergei Tigipko's companies exceeding 160 million USD, which resulted in breaking the rules of NBU about lending limitation to a single customer (Avanza research, 2009; Forsberg 2009 ). In order to comply with NBU regulations, Swedbank either should minimize the exposure against Tigipko's companies or inject additional capital.
During financial crises, the difference between European and Ukrainian banks had escalated. The interests of owners of European banks lie in the orbit of the banking business. It is hard to imagine a situation where a parent bank based in Europe instructs its Ukrainian subsidiary to issue a loan to a specific company or to overlook the rules for issuing loans to one borrower or associated entities. Unlike them, most bank owners in Ukraine have other primary businesses and use their banks as donors more than anything else in times of crisis. Officially, they comply with the NBU's restriction on lending more than 25% of the regulatory capital to one borrower. Yet, some analysts suggest that the real level of insider lending in some captive banks may exceed 50% of the total loan portfolio (Hrebeniuk, 2012) . The regulatory authority does not monitor the entities of big business group owners deeply enough to determine this.
In Sweden, criticism was expressed by several external parties, including Aktiespararna, Swedish Shareholders Association. Aktiespararna questioned how such a big loan could be provided to a single borrower, who at the same time acted as a CEO of Swedbank Ukraine. Lending the substantial amount to a related party would be prohibited under the Swedish Corporate Governance Code, and this is the case for other European banks (Rolander, 2009) . The fact that one billion Swedish krona was not loaned to Sergej Tigipko himself, but to his companies, was not enough to explain and justify the situation to auditors, investors, customers and Swedish public (Mellqvist, 2009) In line with other prudent measures undertaken by Swedbank during Ukrainian crises, change of management from people, loyal to Ukrainian oligarch Tigipko, to western style top professionals, was a necessary step in execution of corporate governance. It was a lot of critic in press, however, that such change should occur much earlier.
Already in September 2011, Swedbank had altered its strategy for the Ukrainian market and started exit the retail segment in order to focus solely on the corporate customers. "The change is in line with our strategy to offer universal banking on our four home markets and have more focused offering in niche markets", -commented Swedbank in a press-release from 20 th of September 2011. The performing mortgage portfolio amounting to 275 million USD was sold to Ukrainian Delta Bank at the end of May 2012. In November 2012, the sale of the retail secured non-performing loans (NPL) in the amount of 229 million USD to collection company Ukrborg and Russian Alfa bank was finalized (Swedbank, Annual report 2012) . Sales of the retail portfolio occurred with sufficient discounts reflecting limited interest of investors in the Ukrainian assets at that time.
Only 5 years later since arrival to Ukraine, in April 2013, Swedbank informed the market that it would totally discontinue its operations in Ukraine. A major part of the remaining portfolio was sold to a local oligarch -Mr. Mykola Lagun, the majority owner in the Ukrainian Delta Bank , April 1). Swedbank Ukraine was renamed to Omega Bank, which occupied the 59th place in the ranking of the NBU on assets at that time. It is interesting to note that the fourth biggest bank in Ukraine, Delta Bank, went bankrupt during 2015 after months of non-compliance, according to the National Bank of Ukraine. Two smaller banks in the Delta Banking group, including Omega Bank that was acquired from Swedbank, were categorized insolvent along with Delta Bank (RT News, 2015) .
2013 would be known in Swedbank's history as a year when Swedbank sold its subsidiary in Ukraine. Besides, operations in Russia were discontinued. In 2014 Swedbank also winded down the Russian subsidiary, which resulted in a loss from discontinued operations of 29 million USD (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) .
SWEDBANK AND INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN UKRAINE: POST GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES
In 2010 the global economy recovered more quickly than expected from the financial crisis. After major production losses in 2009, the Swedish and Baltic economies have begun to improve. The strongest recovery in 2010 was in Sweden, where GDP rose by over 5%. Swedbank's profit amounted to 1 billion USD for 2010, an increase of 2.6 billion USD compared to 2009. The improvement was mainly due to significantly lower credit impairments in the Baltic countries, Russia and Ukraine (Swedbank, Annual report 2010) . The profit for 2014 exceeded 2.1 billion USD, due to stable income, stable expenses and low credit impairments. The share of impaired loans was only 0.41 percent in 2014, which suggests that the credit quality in the loan portfolio is currently good (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) .
The Board of Directors of Swedbank adopted new goals for the bank's risk appetite and risk tolerance, which serve as cornerstones to ensure that Swedbank remains a robust bank going forward. The new decentralized organization in Sweden was introduced by Swedbank, giving more decision-making power to managers working close to the clients. Decentralization should both improve customer satisfaction and allow for closer risk monitoring.
In line with other banks, Swedbank is focusing on structural changes undergoing in banking industry including broad usage of digital channels -telephone, internet and mobile. In addition to improvements for customers, digitalization creates opportunities for banks, which can profit from efficiency gains such as reduced use of cash in society. On the other hand, competition in banking increases as new niche players' stream into the industry offering loans and providing banking services.
"We want to be a modern and attractive bank in the future", -writes Swedbank in the Annual Report for 2013. Swedbank also plans to maintain a robust balance sheet that can withstand economic swings. Priorities for 2015 and nearest future include improvement of customer value and increase of efficiency (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) .
The financial sector is currently undergoing significant change, including at a regulatory level within the EU. The annual stress tests of major Swedish banks conducted by the Riksbank and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA) in 2014 showed Swedbank's resilience. During 2014, the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio increased to 21.2 per cent, which is a very high level (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) .
The global recovery in 2014 was unbalanced. The US continued to grow, while the Eurozone was threatened by slower activity and deflation. Shaky global economic conditions could impact the relatively strong growth in Sweden and the Baltic countries. Increasing international competition and digitalization contribute to low Swedish inflation, which coupled with a low interest rate environment, is pinching bank profits and credit demand in the industrial sector. Urbanization and population growth, together with a shortage of housing construction in major Swedish cities, are driving credit demand in the real estate sector, but could mean even higher and more risky levels of household debt.
Credit demand in Swedbank's home remains uncertain. Swedbank's lending rose by modest 2.6% in 2013; in Baltic Banking, the lending portfolio grew slightly in Estonia and Lithuania, but decreased in Latvia. The discontinuation of the Russian and Ukrainian operations reduced lending volume by 638 million USD in 2013 (Swedbank, Annual report 2013) . During 2014, lending volumes grew to 171 billion USD, mainly attributable to raise in mortgage and acquisition of Sparbanken Öresund (Swedbank, Annual report 2014) .
Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are Swedbank's home markets. To support customers' businesses, Swedbank also has operations in Norway, Finland, Denmark, the US, China and Luxembourg. In 2014 Swedbank decided to open a representative office in Johannesburg, South Africa, in order to explore business opportunities in the rapidly growing African market (Fond & Bank, 2014, June 9) . This is, however, a minor investment in an office with few employees.
Limited growth possibilities seem to remain a certain problem for Swedbank Group. The same challenge Swedbank faced before the global financial crises, when a step was taken to explore transition economies in Baltics, Russia and Ukraine.
FDI' stream into Ukraine stopped due to the global recession and the severe economic crisis affecting the country. State Statistics Service of Ukraine estimated that after partial recovery in 2010 (almost 24% increase compared to 2009), the FDI flux dried again, declining from 4.13 billion USD in 2012 to 2.86 billion USD in 2013 (InterfaxUkraine, 2014).
Apart from the economic downturn, the inefficient and corrupted legal system, complexity of legislation and regulation, poor contract enforcement and poor governance constitute serious impediments to investment. This is so despite the fact that the country has its strengths: a large domestic market, proven agricultural potential, energy and mineral resources and a strategic geographic location which makes it a transit hub and a gate to Europe. Russia's annexation of Crimea, military operations in the Eastern Ukraine and escalation of the dispute between Ukraine's gas company Naftogaz and Gazprom of Russia led to a volatile political situation.
First of all, the global macroeconomic environment should be taken into consideration: year 2008 saw the start of the most serious international financial crisis since 1930s. At the same time, in 2007 we saw the highest peak of prices for Ukrainian banks.
"It is always easy to have comments in retrospect. Our investment in the Baltics in 1996 was strategically right then, and is right now, even if the countries are in trouble. The problems will be solved in time and there will be an interesting market in our region to remain active on", -commented Swedbank's former Chairman Carl Eric Stålberg in an interview in 2008, just in the middle of the crises. He continued: "If you put everything in a retrospective, the timing on the Bank's entry into Ukraine could have been better… It is clear that it would have been fun to make this investment at a different time". At the same time, Stålberg emphasized that Ukrainian exposure accounted only for 1.5 percent of total lending (Joons, 2008) .
But was it only the timing that was wrong? Swedbank's CEO Michael Wolf stressed in the Annual report for 2010 that "an important lesson from the financial crisis for Swedbank and other banks is to maintain full control over liquidity risks and ensure long-term financing, rather than maximise profitability from a short-term perspective". That is an important advice for banks when they considering FDI abroad.
Swedbank's experience is Ukraine also shows the importance of investment environment for decision-makers. As long as changes in the environment are smooth and predictable, the firm can use its knowledge to invest and reach an expected outcome. But the critical problem is when the environmental changes are not predictable, than the company should be able to adjust the strategy quickly to address the new non-expected challenges.
It is impossible to answer the question if the decisions to leave Ukraine by foreign banks, literally at any cost, are right or wrong. What is obvious, however, that foreign banks entering transition economies should not limit their business strategy to growth plans based upon cheap forex loans. They should have a long-term strategy operating through the economic cycle, including proper risk management in place, clear corporate governance procedure, well-functioning steering of foreign activities by owners and possibilities to quickly adapt to radical changes.
According to Business Sweden 4 , as of 2014, about 100 Swedish companies are established in Ukraine and approximately 400 -have close business relationships. Case of Swedbank in Ukraine might help not only to understand why certain firms choose to invest in Ukraine, but also why many others did not invest, and eventually, should not invest.
Former CEO Jan Lidén and Carl Eric Stålberg, Chairman of the Board of Swedbank AB at the time of crises, were often blamed for Swedbank's expensive internalization strategy. There are some indications, however, that the Swedish lending crisis in the transition economies was not a mistake of few managers, but a systemic error.
In 2006, Swedish banks had over 53.4 billion USD exposure to the Baltic states, which was also characterized by a mismatch of currencies. Mismatch of currencies happens if borrowing and lending amounts are distributed in different currencies. Already in 2006, Riksbank warned that this development could become unsustainable (Sveriges Riksbank, 2006 ). Sweden's financial supervisory authority (SFSA), Finansinspektionen, was aware of the risks, but took no countermeasures (Finansinspektionen, 2006) . Global financial crises highlighted the urgency of better control over the financial system. The EU's Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), which contain new rules on capital adequacy, liquidity and corporate governance of banks, were approved in June 2013 and took effect on the 1 st of January 2014. The Swedish banking system is dependent on market funding, therefore, is sensitive to adverse developments abroad. As decided by SFSA, Swedish banks must hold larger capital and liquidity buffers than the minimum requirements imposed by the EU. A part of the new Swedish requirements is that banks must set aside extra capital of 1% from September 2015 in what is known as the countercyclical capital buffer. This figure should be raised to 1.5% from 27 th of June 2016, given the present economic conditions (Finansinspektionen, 2015, May 26) .
Although certain measures have been introduced, a lot of challenges remain to be addressed including high household debt in Sweden, risk weights 5 for private mortgage loans and necessity to extend the maturity for the banks' funding (Finansinspektionen, 2014) . It is also important to decide upon clear responsibility structure among the different bodies steering the banking system. The report from 2010 from Riksdagen, Swedish Parliament, pointed that there is no formal mechanism through which SFSA and Riksbank can discuss their opinions on stability issues (Goodhart and Rochet, 2011) . There is also no formal mechanism for documenting these opinions, whether you agree or not. When Riksbank did have a concern about Swedish banks' exposure to transition economies, there is actually no clear documentation on SFSA's reaction about Riksbank's concern, and different people remember the situation in different ways. If (and when) the warning signals would appear, powerful action plan with clear responsibilities is needed, preventing the banking system from possible troubles.
Lessons learned from unsuccessful investment cases deserve attention from both researchers and practitioners. Serious work is required both on a company and on institutional level in Sweden in order to avoid future Poltava losses.
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